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Introduction
The field of genetics has seen many advances in the last 60 years: 
the discovery of the DNA double helix in 1953, recombinant DNA 
in the early 1970s; the development of the polymerase chain 
reaction in 1983; and the Human Genome Project between 1990 
and 2003. Industrial applications are found in a vast range of 
fields, from genetic testing, biopharmaceuticals, vaccines and stem 
cell therapy, through biofuels and other industrial fermentation 
processes to biotechnologically-enhanced crops. While bringing 
significant benefits to society, modern biotechnology is also 
highly controversial, and poses a number of regulatory challenges. 
Recent developments in the field increasingly permit the deliberate 
design of genes, DNA strands, and even entire genomes. Such 
“synthetic biology” is currently an emerging technology. However, 
contemporary governance arrangements are partially inadequate to 
cope with the challenges the technology may pose once it finds 
widespread commercial application. Below, after giving a brief 
introduction to the technology itself, I identify such gaps in the 
international biosafety and biosecurity regimes. While regulation 
needs to be as unobtrusive as possible as not to hamper innovation 
in the field, precautionary decision-making in the area is required 
in order to address various risks, ranging from unregulated 
transboundary movements of biological materials to security risks 
associated with potential weaponization.
From recombinant DNA to directed evolution
The invention of recombinant DNA technology in the early 1970s 
allowed for the combination of genetic materials from different 
sources. Through the insertion of selected genes, host organisms 
could now be modified to display traits that were hitherto impossible 
to obtain via traditional breeding methods. For example, the 
insertion of genes responsible for the synthesis of beta-carotene 
into ordinary rice permitted the production of an improved variety 
(“Golden Rice”) intended for agricultural production in regions 
with chronic vitamin A deficits. In medicine, recombinant DNA 
technology allowed the creation of a Hepatitis B vaccine by inserting 
a viral gene into yeast. For designing insect-resistant crops, genetic 
parts of the Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium have been used for 
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endowing potatoes, maize or cotton with insecticidal properties. 
While all those applications involved the combination of existing 
DNA, recent technological advances allow for its de novo synthesis 
in the laboratory. Whereas traditional genetic engineering is “a cut 
and paste affair, in which biotechnologists shuffled pieces of DNA 
[…] between already existing species”, contemporary synthetic 
biology has been likened to “the biological equivalent of word 
processors” (ETC Group 2011: 3). With computers, custom DNA 
sequences can now be built from inorganic chemical parts based 
on digital blueprints. The technology also allows for the removal 
of superfluous functions from a genome, and its subsequent 
customization to perform specific functions. While defining 
synthetic biology is difficult due to the variety of applications 
and scientific disciplines involved, a common distinction is 
Synthetic biology is an emerging technology with potentially far-reaching 
benefits and risks. As a cross-cutting issue, 
different aspects of synthetic biology fall 
within the scope of different international 
agreements. Contemporary biosafety and 
biosecurity frameworks are characterized 
by important regulatory gaps which policy 
makers need to address to minimize risks 
that may arise in the future both from 
commercial use and weaponization. In 
some cases, this may require formal treaty 
amendments, whereas others can possibly 
be resolved at lower levels, for instance 
through interpretive statements of treaties’ 
decision-making bodies.
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between more recent bottom-up approaches, which “create novel 
biochemical systems and organisms from scratch, using nothing 
but chemical reagents”, and older top-down approaches, treating 
“existing organisms, genes, enzymes, and other biological 
materials as parts or tools” (Presidential Commission 2010: 36).
While synthetic biology is still in its infancy, a number of 
commercially-viable applications nevertheless already exist. 
Those include the production of biofuels, molecules, essential 
oils, pharmaceutical products such as the anti-Malaria medicine 
Artemisinin, the influenza vaccine Tamiflu, or the antibiotic 
Cephalexin. At the same time, commercial providers are offering 
mail-order shipment of customized, synthetical DNA, and low-
end oligonucleotide synthesizers for home use are available for 
less than 10,000 US$. The technology has numerous implications 
for international biosafety and biosecurity regimes, ranging 
from gaps in current treaties regarding synthetically-produced 
organisms and micro-organisms, to the security implications of 
do-it-yourself production of biological agents.
Implications for the international biosafety regime
Biosafety entails the regulation of biological materials 
intended for both contained use and deliberate release into 
the environment in the absence of an intent to harm. Usage of 
biological materials in laboratory settings is presently subject to 
a wide range of regulations, with the World Health Organization, 
the US and the European Union prescribing different biosafety 
levels depending on the potential hazards for workers and the 
risk of unintentional release of materials. It is presently unclear 
whether existing biocontainment standards will be sufficient for 
organisms produced via synthetic biology. However, laboratory 
safety does not require international action, as it can be 
sufficiently addressed at the domestic level. Presently, only a 
small number of facilities designated as the highest biosafety 
level (BSL-4) exist worldwide. Most of those are concentrated in 
industrialized countries such as Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the UK and the US, where domestic regulatory 
standards are already high. However, a risk is the “diffusion of 
technology, knowledge and capabilities beyond the professional 
biotechnology community” (Schmidt 2008), that is, to individuals 
without professional training and outside the tightly-regulated 
laboratory context. While such uses may require novel forms of 
regulatory oversight at the domestic level, they do not necessarily 
require new forms of international action. 
Secondly, policy-makers increasingly recognize the risks 
of modern biotechnology intentionally released into the 
environment. Agricultural biotechnology, in particular, poses 
risks such as genetically modified organisms either outcompeting 
non-modified species or causing undesired mutations through 
gene transfer. Additionally, there is currently little insight into 
the toxicity and allergenicity of genetically modified food. 
In the European Union, concerns about the risks of modern 
biotechnology have led to strict regulations. Commercial 
releases of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) are subject 
to prior risk assessment and require authorization by competent 
national authorities under the participation of Member States 
and the European Commission. All products consisting of 
or containing GMOs are traced throughout the supply chain, 
and any products placed on the market containing more than 
“adventitious or technically unavoidable” amounts of GMOs 
are subject to mandatory labelling (Regulation EC 1830/2003), 
and both the contained use and deliberate release of GMOs are 
subject to strict regulatory requirements (Directives 2009/41/EC 
and 2001/18/EC). 
However, a number of important gaps exist in the international 
regulatory framework. Internationally, the primary treaties 
for biosafety are the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 1995 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures and the 2000 Convention on Biological Diversity’s 
Cartagena Biosafety Protocol. The former delimits the scope of 
WTO member states for restricting international trade based 
on considerations of food safety and animal and plant health. 
The latter agreement allows for precautionary decision-making 
in the import of “Living Modified Organisms” (LMOs), enabling 
member states to subject certain imports of those materials to 
an Advance Informed Agreement procedure. The Protocol does 
not currently have wide coverage, as a number of LMO exporting 
countries have not ratified it. It also possesses a number of 
gaps regarding synthetic biology: First, the Protocol’s Article 3 
definition of LMOs does not cover their constituent parts (i.e. 
plasmids and purified DNA). This allows for the cross-border 
transfer and subsequent assembly of LMOs outside of the 
Protocol’s scope. Second, the Protocol does not include digital 
transfers of DNA sequences within its definition of “transit” and 
“transboundary movement”. Where DNA can be synthesized 
domestically, based on sequence data received from abroad, this 
undercuts the Protocol’s goal of ensuring that the “development, 
handling, transport, use, transfer and release of any living 
modified organisms are undertaken in a manner that prevents 
or reduces the risks to biological diversity, taking also into 
account risks to human health” (Cartagena Protocol Article 2.2). 
However, effective monitoring of such digital transfers is virtually 
impossible. Third and finally, the Protocol’s Advance Informed 
Agreement procedure, allowing for import restrictions for LMOs 
based on precautionary decision-making and risk assessment, 
does not apply to LMOs intended for contained use. This raises 
the question of whether domestic biocontainment standards 
for organisms produced via synthetic biology are sufficient, or 
whether Advance Informed Agreement would be necessary for 
importing parties to judge the soundness of containment. 
Gaps thus exist regarding the definition of LMOs under the 
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Cartagena Protocol, the regulation of domestic LMO synthesis 
based on sequence data received from abroad and, possibly, the 
import of high risk synthetic materials for laboratory use. Some 
of those issues are more easily resolvable than others. Regulating 
the transfer of sequence data is the most challenging, also 
with respect to biosecurity (see below). Regulatory gaps in the 
definition of LMOs might be addressed through an interpretative 
decision by the Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol. 
For instance, whether plasmids, small DNA molecules existing 
independently from chromosomal DNA, count as “living” 
organisms or not is a matter of debate among biologists. Finally, 
whether an Advance Informed Agreement procedure is necessary 
for synthetic materials intended for contained use depends on 
their risks relative to non-synthetic LMOs.
Implications for the international biosecurity regime
Biosecurity refers to “the protection, control of, and 
accountability for high-consequence biological agents and 
toxins, and critical relevant biological materials and information, 
to prevent unauthorized possession, loss, theft, misuse, 
diversion, or intentional release” (NSABB 2010: 10). While 
international biosecurity regulations focus on the acquisition of 
biological weapons by states, recent technological developments 
increasingly allow for the manufacturing of such weapons by 
private actors. Concerns about biosecurity has intensified in 
recent years, with methods for genetically-engineering H5N1 
influenza viruses directly transmissible between humans 
published in Science and Nature (Garrett 2013). A few years 
earlier, scientists were able to artificially reconstruct the genome 
of the H1N1 influenza strain responsible for the “Spanish Flu” 
which, at that time, caused at least 50 million deaths within a 
timespan of a few months. The increasing availability of sequence 
data is accompanied by the emergence of a broad range of 
commercial providers for synthesized DNA. In 2006, journalists 
working for the Guardian were able to obtain parts of the 
genome of the smallpox virus simply by placing a mail order with 
a commercial provider. In itself, knowledge of a DNA sequence 
plus access to synthesized genes is not sufficient for producing 
a viable pathogen. Resulting DNA needs to be transplanted into 
host cells, which require sufficient replication in order to yield 
effective amounts and, depending on the agent in question, the 
development of a delivery system may also be beyond the reach 
of nonstate actors. At the same time, the increasing technical 
ease with which pathogens may be synthesized, or enhanced for 
higher infectivity, better transmission or resistance to antibiotics 
or vaccines, poses significant challenges to the existing 
biosecurity regime.
Internationally, the main framework for biosecurity is the 1972 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
(BWC). The Convention prohibits the development, stockpiling, 
acquisition and retainment by contracting parties of “[m]icrobial 
or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have 
no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes” (BWC Article 1, my italics). While the Convention’s 
effectiveness is limited by the absence of a verification regime 
and imprecise obligations for domestic implementation, 
synthetically-produced biological weapons clearly fall under 
its scope. The international biosecurity regime has, in recent 
years, shifted from focusing on disarmament to preventing and 
responding to utilization by non-state actors (Kelle 2007). The 
chemical weapons attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995 and the 
2001 Anthrax attacks in the US fueled a discourse centered on the 
usage of weapons of mass destruction by nonstate actors, rather 
than states. Biological warfare became to be perceived as a threat 
to the general population, instead of merely the armed forces. 
This led to strong linkages developing between the biosecurity 
and public health regimes. The World Health Organization’s 
(WHO) recently revised International Health Regulations (IHRs) to 
oblige each state party to notify the organization in case of an 
“unexpected or unusual public health event within its territory, 
irrespective of origin or source, which may constitute a public 
health emergency of international concern” (IHRs Article 7, my 
italics). The WHO’s 2011 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
Framework builds on the notification requirements under the 
IHRs, obliging member states to share influenza virus strains 
with WHO-designated laboratories for the rapid development of 
vaccines. Finally, the WHO has recently been holding informal 
consultations on Dual Use Research of Concern in the issue area. 
Increasing fears of bioterrorism are thus accompanied by the 
development of strong linkages between the biosecurity and 
public health regimes. 
Historically, very few instances exist of states using biological 
weapons. While future uses by states cannot be ruled out, the 
present challenge for international biosecurity arises from the 
ease with which nonstate actors may be able to manufacture 
“home-brewed” bacteriological or viral agents. Regulatory gaps 
exist less in the response to such attacks, but rather in their 
prevention. International harmonization of domestic regulations 
may be required for addressing transboundary movement 
of synthesized DNA offered by commercial providers. The 
gaps in the Cartagena Protocol regarding constituent parts of 
LMOs, discussed above, are equally relevant for transboundary 
movement of materials intended for weaponization. This would 
prevent the acquisition of materials from jurisdictions with 
relatively low regulatory standards. A second challenge arises not 
from physical transport, but from the electronic transfer of DNA 
sequence data allowing for the domestic production of biological 
agents. Regulating the transboundary exchange of digitalized 
genetic codes may turn out to be impossible, considering that 
such information is increasingly becoming part of the public 
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domain. Proposals have been made for commercial providers 
of synthetic DNA to use standardized computer software for 
determining whether customers are ordering material suitable 
for weaponization. Within the United States, a voluntary scheme 
exists for the screening of customers, which could be a basis for 
international harmonization in order to, again, prevent potentially 
dangerous materials from being acquired in jurisdictions with 
insufficient domestic regulation.
Conclusions
Synthetic biology is an emerging technology that has not yet 
been widely marketized. Nevertheless, present institutional 
arrangements on the international level are in some respects 
insufficient to deal with the potential future risks the technology 
might pose. In particular, gaps exist regarding the transboundary 
movement of purified DNA, electronic transfers of sequence 
data, as well as the surveillance of commercial providers offering 
custom-tailored DNA. While the securitization of global health 
politics raises a number of problems in itself, an increased focus 
of health governance on risks associated with biological agents 
may provide appropriate response measures for both intentional 
and unintentional releases of new biological hazards. 
As with other emerging technological developments, from 
nanotechnology, 3D printing and fully-autonomous robots 
to geoengineering, synthetic biology holds both risks and 
promises. Similar to chemistry and nuclear technology, one 
major challenge is the dual-use problematique, particularly 
if synthetic biology will allow determined nonstate actors to 
manufacture weapons of mass destruction at limited costs. Yet 
the commercial application of high-risk technology also entails 
significant regulatory challenges. 
Policy-makers have increasingly acknowledged in recent years 
that risks are frequently unknown, and that regulation may be 
required even if neither probability nor costs of catastrophic 
events may be quantifiable. Accordingly, precautionary decision-
making is required to balance risks and benefits. For example, 
several provisions of the Cartagena Protocol could be clarified 
through decisions by its Meeting of the Parties. Furthermore, 
soft law instruments or private regulations, such as non-binding 
international codes of conduct for commercial providers of 
synthetic DNA could be developed. However, depending on 
the pace and scope of technological development, more far-
reaching and institutionalized forms of international regulation 
(e.g. formal amendments to existing international agreements or 
even the negotiation of new ones) may be required in the future. 
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